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Abstract 
Several economic models predict that effort may decline as retirement 
approaches. These models are reviewed and data from the University of  Iceland 
used to measure how research productivity of  members of  staff  depends 
on age. We find support for the hypothesis that men are at a greater risk of  
becoming inactive when they approach retirement. Moreover, men tend to 
be more research active than women in their thirties and forties but lose their 
edge in their fifties and sixties. Finally, we detect a cohort effect such that later 
cohorts are more productive than earlier ones.
Keywords: Tenure; work effect.
JEL: J14, J22
Introduction
The term “deadwood” is sometime used in the university context to describe professors 
or other tenured academics who are no longer effective or useful to their employing in-
stitution.1 Workers in other professions may also gradually reduce their effort as they get 
older. Some may also choose to move to professions where opportunities for on-the-job 
leisure are greater. Thus politicians sometimes end up as diplomats, football players may 
become celebrities and movie stars may take on fewer roles and end up enjoying leisure 
and sometimes fame. In some cases the decision is driven by physical deterioration, such 
as in sports, but in other cases it is less clear why effort would decline with age.2 
The objective of  this paper is to review some of  the economic models that predict that 
effort declines with age and then to use data on research activity at the University of  Ice-
land to test these hypotheses, in particular to test whether research tends to fall with age. 
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1. Causes of inactivity in late career 
There is empirical evidence showing research productivity to be declining with age. 
Diamond (1986) uses a longitudinal data set for scientists and mathematicians and finds 
that the quantity and quality of  research output appear to decline continuously with age. 
Levin and Stephan (1991) use data from the Survey of  Doctorate Recipients and the Sci-
ence Citation Index and find, using longitudinal data, that research activity declined with 
age in five of  the six areas studied.3 Goodwin and Sauer (1995) studied the output of  ac-
ademic economists in a sample of  140 tenured professors at seven research oriented uni-
versities in the U.S. They found that research output was hump shaped with age so that it 
initially increased and then declined until retirement. Oster and Hamermesh (1998) find 
that economists’ productivity measured by publications in leading journals declines with 
age, although the probability of  acceptance, once an article has been submitted to a lead-
ing journal, is independent of  age.4 Moreover they find that the median age of  authors 
of  articles in leading economics journals was 36 in the 1980s and the 1990s and that a 
very small minority of  authors are over 50 in spite of  a substantial proportion of  AEA 
members being over the age of  50.5 However, they cannot discriminate between the two 
possible reasons for this observation; whether the falling frequency of  publications is 
due to deteriorating mental faculties or, alternatively, reflects rational decisions to devote 
less time to research. In contrast, Jan van Ours (2009) finds no relationship between the 
quality-adjusted rate of  publication and age among his colleagues at Tilburg University.
Reduced research activity among older professors may be caused by them shirking 
their duties. But they could also have chosen to spend more of  their time on admin-
istrative duties or the mentoring of  younger colleagues. Increased shirking has been 
discovered in other professions. Figlio (1995), using a multi-year panel data set, found 
that politicians who have decided to retire from politics often vote against the party line. 
In this way they shirk their duties as party members. Parker and Powers (2002) found 
that members of  Congress who are about to leave office spend more on foreign travel 
knowing that they will not be held accountable by voters. In sports, Krautmann and So-
low (2009) found that baseball players who are less likely to sign a subsequent contract 
performed worse, and Cain (2011) found that hockey players´ performance worsened as 
the likelihood of  retirement increased.
Standard human capital models can be used to explain why effort may decline with 
age. Using the Mincer (1958) framework, workers have to choose between working to 
earn wages and investing in human capital. Academic research has an investment dimen-
sion in that current effort yields future publications that the academic adds to his resume 
and increases his future employability. He may also learn from doing the research and 
add to his human capital in that way also. Alternatively, he may focus on consulting and 
teaching, which generates higher current income. In the Ben-Porath (1967) model, we 
can think of  “academic human capital” as having a particularly high depreciation rate – 
a lot of  work is required just to keep up to date – and as people get close to retirement 
they have a smaller incentive to invest in human capital since there are few years left to 




smaller incentive to research and publish in order to get a better job at another univer-
sity. The empirical prediction of  the human capital approach is hence that human capital 
and research activity may decline with age. 
A related reason for why research may fall as retirement approaches is described in 
Chen and Zoega (2015). Here the consequences of  neglecting research are less serious 
in terms of  future career prospects for the older worker because he has fewer remaining 
years in paid employment left. We use the model of  Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) where 
workers avoid shirking their duties only out of  fear of  being dismissed and made unem-
ployed. We show that this threat is less serious for workers approaching retirement and 
therefore they face a greater incentive to shirk their duties, something that workers like 
to do in this model if  they do not fear dismissal. We will refer to the implications of  this 
and the Ben-Porath effect as the “human capital effect.”
There is yet another reason why research productivity may be declining in age, ex-
plained in a theoretical model in Chen and Zoega (2011). Research output is partly sto-
chastic in our model – sometimes an editor or a referee likes a paper because he happens 
to be working on something similar; clearly the choice of  referees has a random element; 
co-authors may work hard or not; and we have family issues that can distract us and so 
forth. Faced with disappointments, the model predicts that the young may decide to 
stay research active because they can hope for future successes knowing that they have a 
long future ahead. Continuing with research in spite of  setbacks has an option value in 
the model since future research may be better received. In contrast, the older professors 
may think that they are not likely to be lucky in the short remaining span of  their tenure 
and become inactive. Thus, remaining research active allows a professor to hope for 
future (publication) success, the more years he has left the more time he has to realize 
these hopes. For this reason old professors may be either very good or inactive while the 
mediocre younger ones decide to stay research active in the hope of  future successes. We 
refer to this as the “selection effect.”
Finally, we can think of  a “cohort effect” when an older cohort of  academics had 
more limited opportunities to do research when young due to more limited resources of-
fered by their university and chose to focus more on teaching. A university may also have 
changed from being a teaching university to becoming a research university. This was the 
case for the University of  Iceland. Research inactive older workers may then only reflect 
this change of  focus. As this cohort ages it appears in a cross section of  members of  
staff  that the older workers have reduced their research output while this is not the case. 
We will explore data from the University of  Iceland to assess the empirical validity 
of  the three hypotheses; the human capital effect, the selection effect, and the cohort 
effect, first by looking at cross-sectional data and then by looking at panel data.
2. Research output measured and analysed
The empirical prediction of  the human capital effect is that research activity should be 
declining in age as the academic approaches retirement and that all university teachers, 
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in contrast, has the implication that there are relatively more completely inactive people 
among the older cohorts while old active academics may be no less active than their 
younger colleagues. The cohort effect would show up in low activity but not because an-
yone has reduced his or her research but because the older cohort was never very active 
because they either did not have the resources from the university to conduct research, 
were overburdened by teaching or the university was primarily a teaching university dur-
ing their tenure. The alternative hypothesis would be that people continue research until 
and perhaps beyond retirement because they enjoy it.
In this section we use data on research output from the University of  Iceland (UI) to 
test the first two predictions while in the following section we explore the implications 
of  the cohort effect.7 The university uses data on research activity to calculate a single 
measure of  activity for each member of  staff  per year. Activities such as publishing pa-
pers in academic journals and books, seminar presentations, conference attendance and 
so forth each give a fixed number of  points each that are then summed up to generate 
one grand total for each member of  staff  (see appendix). The same point system is used 
for all departments, which enables us to study research activity for the whole university. 
We use data for the calendar year 2008 when 640 members of  staff  were assessed. Ta-
bles A1 and A2 in the appendix summarise the data and Figure A1 shows the distribu-
tion of  output for eight age groups. We should note at the outset that this performance 
measure is by no means perfect and has important limitations.8
In Table 1 we show the number of  research inactive member of  staff  for each age 
group where research inactivity is defined as having zero points in the UI measure of  
research activity. We note that this is higher for the oldest three groups than for the 
younger groups and more than doubles as a proportion of  the number of  people in each 
group between the 60-64 and 65-70 years groups. In the 65-70 group we find that 30% 
are inactive. Since the point system measures not just the number of  articles published 
in academic journals but also working papers, seminar presentations and so forth, these 
individuals can be said to be completely inactive when it comes to research.
Table 1. Number of inactive (zero point) members of staff in 2008 by age group
Age 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-70
 Inactive 1 5 9 6 14 23 12 18
 Total 20 45 70 91 130 137 88 60
 % 5 11.1 12.9 6.6 10.8 16.8 13.6 30
Research inactivity is defined as having zero points in the UI system of  measuring research activity. Of  the 18 inactive 
individuals in the oldest group we find that 14 are men (31% of  all men in the age group) and 4 women (26.7% of  all women 
in the age group).
In Table 2 we present results from the estimation of  an equation where output (meas-
ured in points in year 2008) is regressed on dummy variables for eight age groups. The 
objective is to map the age profile of  research. Columns (1) and (2) have estimates from 




estimation procedure that can accommodate a high probability mass at zero, which is 
appropriate since one problem encountered is the many zeros in the dependent variable, 
indicating inactivity.9 The coefficients in the table show the number of  research points 
assigned to a member of  each age group.
Table 2. Relationship between age, gender and research output in a cross section 
in 2008 (Least-squares and Tobit estimation)
All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
age All Active Tobit All Active Tobit All Active Tobit
30-34 27.51 28.96 26.77 29.96 32.10 28.86 20.16 20.16 20.16
(5.71) (5.97) (5.26) (4.98) (5.30) (4.44) (3.48) (3.48) (3.54)
35-39 26.61 30.02 24.89 30.84 37.26 27.96 18.43 18.43 18.43
(5.82) (6.13) (5.07) (4.65) (5.06) (3.82) (5.71) (5.70) (5.81)
40-44 31.52 36.17 29.70 35.96 44.68 32.89 25.25 26.15 24.89
(8.98) (9.85) (7.76) (6.77) (7.95) (5.47) (6.78) (6.97) (6.58)
45-49 25.53 27.33 24.53 27.58 29.62 26.41 21.93 23.35 21.25
(10.13) (10.55) (9.19) (8.17) (8.54) (7.36) (6.06) (6.29) (5.69)
50-54 26.40 29.58 24.77 28.73 32.97 26.54 23.68 25.83 22.76
(11.56) (12.35) (10.01) (8.42) (9.13) (7.06) (8.02) (8.44) (7.45)
55-59 22.99 27.67 20.38 23.80 29.19 20.60 21.30 24.68 19.72
(11.12) (12.32) (8.53) (8.62) (9.54) (6.40) (7.62) (8.60) (6.25)
60-64 21.80 25.24 19.96 19.56 23.86 16.37 26.88 27.90 26.88
(9.94) (10.96) (7.98) (7.58) (8.51) (5.12) (6.65) (6.86) (6.77)
65-70 18.53 26.47 13.14 18.57 26.96 12.16 18.39 25.07 42750
(6.24) (7.36) (3.34) (5.41) (6.45) (2.55) (3.04) (3.47) (2.10)
R-sq. 0.02 0.02 - 0.04 0.04 - 0.01 0.01 -
Obs. 640 552 640 411 342 411 229 210 229
The first two columns use OLS (White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance ) to estimate the effect 
of  age while the last one uses Tobit estimation. The numbers in parentheses in columns (1) and (2) are t-statistics while the 
numbers in parentheses in columns (3) are z-statistics.
The results suggest that research output is rising until the early forties and then declining 
when both sexes are combined. Men slow significantly down in their fifties and sixties, 
so much that the average number of  points drops from around 36 in their early forties to 
about 18 in their late sixties or by 50%. Women also peak in their early forties at around 
25 points and decline to 18 in their late sixties. It follows that men tend to produce more 
than women in their thirties and forties but lose their edge in their fifties and sixties. 
However, the null hypothesis that research output remains the same throughout life can 
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workers groups together.10
In the second column we include only the research active. For the whole sample, 
research activity is now less declining in age – although peaking in the early 40s – and 
for women output in the 65-70 age group exceeds that in the 30-39 age groups.11 The 
equality of  coefficients can no longer be rejected for men at the 5% level of  significance 
although it can still be rejected at the 10% level. However, the point estimates indicate 
that output is declining for men so that it peaks at 40-44 as before and falls by close to 
40% in the 65-70 group. This suggests that it is to some extent the research inactive in 
later working life that pull down average research activity for men in these years although 
inactivity cannot account for all of  the falling output. We should note that the results 
are robust to the exclusion of  any one of  the academic departments. Finally, the last 
column has a (censored) Tobit regression on the whole sample. This gives similar results 
to the least squares estimation on the whole sample. These results provide support for 
the selection effect in that leaving out the inactive changes the results.
In Table 3 we redo the estimation of  Table 2 but control for academic departments 
and academic position. All explanatory variables are dummy variables for the age groups, 
for the academic department and for academic position.12 
Table 3. Research output, age, academic departments and positions in a cross 
section in 2008 (least-squares and Tobit estimation)
All (1)* All (2)* Active (3)* Tobit (4)**
Age
Group
30-34 30.73  (5.14) 36.67 (5.94) 36.62 (5.92) 38.25 (5.87)
35-39 28.65  (4.87) 34.81 (5.88) 37.68 (5.87) 35.62 (5.66)
40-44 36.29  (6.72) 40.12 (7.38) 43.18 (7.55) 40.67 (7.13)
45-49 29.95  (6.69) 30.71 (6.86) 32.06 (6.79) 30.92 (6.70)
50-54 30.89  (6.02) 30.48 (5.86) 32.99 (5.96) 29.99 (5.61)
55-59 28.13  (6.42) 25.05 (5.65) 29.45 (6.22) 23.08 (4.93)
60-64 26.03  (5.44) 22.19 (4.46) 24.31 (4.51) 20.62 (3.99)
65-70 22.03  (4.80) 19.19 (4.20) 24.79 (4.87) 14.01 (2.79)
Academic
Departments
Social and human sciences 8.73  (1.56) 0.94 (0.12) -1.31 (0.17) 1.21 (0.15)
Social work -6.89  (0.93) -7.31 (0.88) -12.11 (1.37) -5.31 (0.63)
Economics 3.84  (0.42) -2.33 (0.28) 1.86 (0.21) -4.35 (0.48)
Law -2.89  (0.44) -8.34 (1.07) -7.46 (0.89) -10.19 (1.20)
Political science 10.73  (1.09) -2.32 (0.20) -6.32 (0.52) -2.71 (0.23)
Business Administration -16.94  (3.26) -19.47 (2.63) -24.33 (2.95) -21.48 (2.69)
Nursing -11.66  (1.96) -14.90 (1.97) -16.42 (2.04) -15.31 (1.89)
Pharmaceutical sciences -9.95  (1.19) -22.27 (2.32) -25.01 (2.59) -22.99 (2.34)
Medicine -11.60  (2.46) -16.63 (2.50) -16.64 (2.34) -19.42 (2.73)
Food science and nutrition 7.85  (0.63) 1.77 (0.16) -2.32 (0.20) 2.59 (0.23)
Psychology 3.67 (0.37) - 2.12 (0.20) -6.41(0.59) -1.24 (0.12)




Languages, literature and linguistics -13.21  (2.37) -16.13 (2.13) -17.00 (2.11) -17.48 (2.06)
Theology and religious studies -11.93  (1.72) -18.18 (2.14) -20.50 (2.20) -20.69 (2.11)
Icelandic and comparative cultural st. 2.83  (0.40) -4.18 (0.48) -8.47 (0.94) -3.13 (0.35)
History and philosophy 10.09  (1.49) 0.90 (0.12) -3.05 (0.39) 1.46 (0.19)
Sport, leisure st. and social education -9.89  (1.44) - 9.78 (1.22) -11.93 (1.47) -9.02 (1.04)
Teacher education -7.66  (1.57) -5.52 (0.78) -9.91 (1.29) -3.68 (0.49)
Educational studies 2.21  (0.32) -2.63 (0.32) -6.29 (0.73) -1.20 (0.14)
Industrial-, mech. eng. and comp.s. -9.46  (1.66) -20.74 (2.65) -18.61 (2.22) -24.04 (2.76)
Earth sciences 11.05  (1.74) -3.69 (0.46) -8.69 (1.01) -2.34 (0.29)
Life and environmental sciences -2.59  (0.49) -0.60 (0.07) -14.24 (1.91) -11.78 (1.57)
Electrical and computer engineering 3.20  (0.29) -5.00 (0.45) -3.39 (0.27) -7.73 (0.65)
Physical sciences -7.15  (1.29) -18.74 (2.64) -16.62 (2.12) -22.71 (2.93)
Civil and environmental engineering 8.74  (1.03) -11.39 (1.61) -1.93 (0.22) -1.41 (0.16)
Professor 16.98 (3.26) 17.88 (3.29) 18.69 (3.34)
Position Associate professor 3.62 (0.72) 4.43 (0.84) 3.29 (0.60)
Assistant professor -5.78 (1.13) -2.49 (0.46) -8.92 (1.58)
R-squared 0.11 0.20 0.17 -
Observations 640 640 552 640
*) OLS estimates, White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance, t-statistics in parentheses. **) 
z-statistics in parentheses.
We find the same age pattern of  research as in Table 2. In addition, we find that business 
administration was weak in 2008, as well as several other departments such as nursing, 
pharmaceutical sciences, medicine, languages and theology. In contrast, political science, 
history and philosophy, earth sciences and civil and environmental engineering did bet-
ter on average. It should be noted that this pattern may only reflect research output in 
the year 2008 since average output at the departmental level may fluctuate from one year 
to another due to the small size of  departments. In column (2), we also test for an effect 
of  academic titles since professors may reduce their research output because they can 
hope for no further promotions while low output cannot put their status in jeopardy. We 
find that professors at the University of  Iceland have almost 17 points more on average 
than other members of  staff. In column (3) we only include the research active and find, 
as before, that the slowdown in output in later years is still present. 
We finally run a logit regression on the binary variable for inactivity (inactivity gives 
the value one to the variable, otherwise zero), which we explain with age, gender and 
dummy variables for professors, associate professors and assistant professors. The re-
sults for a logit (binary) pooled cross-section, time-series regression for the years 2003-
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Table 4. Logit estimation of the effect of age, sex and position on inactivity using 








Assoc. professor -0.76 7.21
Assist. professor -0.21 2.10
R-squared (McFadden) 0.08
Observations 4942
The dependent variable takes the value 1 if  an individual has no measured research activity (zero points) and 0 otherwise. 
Maximum-likelihood estimation: Logit.
From the coefficient estimates for age and gender we find men below the age of  38 are 
less likely to be inactive than women, but more likely to be inactive than women above 
that age. In contrast, women are less likely to become inactive with age. Assistant pro-
fessors and associate are also more likely to be inactive than professors.13 The results 
suggest that it is age and gender, not status or job security, which affects the probability 
that someone becomes research inactive.
However, we should note that the explanatory power of  the equations is limited 
(R-squared no higher than 0.08), which implies that other factors than age are impor-
tant for the research activity of  each individual. This leads us to the main weakness of  
the estimation which is that some of  the omitted variables may be correlated with age. 
Moreover, the cohort effect may be explaining the inactivity among the older workers, 
reflecting the change in the university from being primarily a teaching university to be-
coming a research university. In order to address this problem we perform panel estima-
tion in the following section.
3. Cohort effects and individual heterogeneity
The regression analysis in the previous section suffers from the limitation that the age-
productivity relationship may be caused by individual-specific unmeasurable heterogene-
ity and also cohort effects. In particular, the older academics may be less active because 
they belong to a different cohort that may not have had the resources, opportunities or 
pressure to develop their research potential due to changed university policies. In order 
to control for this the panel regression – a pooled cross-section, time-series analysis – 
with random effects reported in Table 5 was performed using data on research output 
for 719 individuals in the seven years from 2003 to 2009. Here individual research activ-




The first column of  Table 5 reports the results when all members of  staff  are includ-
ed. The regressors include the age of  each individual, his rank and academic department 
(results not shown but used as controls). A dummy variable for gender (male =1) and an 
interaction term for this dummy variable and age is added in column (2). In column (3) 
there are cohort effects through the interaction of  age and a dummy variable for year 
2003 and a dummy for year 2009. The cohort effects test whether someone at a given 
age in 2003 was more or less productive than someone at the same age in 2009. Research 
inactive individuals are omitted in column (4).
Table 5. Relationship between research output, age and cohort using a pooled 
cross-section time-series regression 2003-2009 (cross-section random effects)
Variable All All All Active
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -19.33 8.53 12.53 22.57
(5.77) (1.73) (2.48) (0.78)
Age -0.19 0.04 -0.04 -0.17
(2.88) (0.42) (0.43) (1.50)
D-male 17.29 17.03 13.66
(2.92) (2.87) (2.11)






Professor 29.69 29.58 30.56 27.75
(13.44) (13.29) (13.65) (11.59)
Associate professor 14.04 13.72 14.18 12.01
(6.36) (6.20) (6.40) (5.07)
Assistant professor 5.40 5.35 5.63 4.42
(2.46) (2.44) (2.57) (1.86)
Observations 4941 4941 4941 4071
R-squared 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.17
F-statistic 25.34 22.55 21.54 16.95
Random effects estimator: Swamy and Arora estimator of  component variances. t-statistics in parentheses * indicates 
significance at the 5% level. Departmental controls were included.
The results in column (1) are consistent with the cross-section results in that the coef-
ficient of  age is statistically significant and negative. In column (2) we find that the coef-
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declines more rapidly, consistent with our earlier results. Cohort effects are added in 
column (3), which reveal that individuals of  all ages were less productive in 2003 than in 
2009. This implies that cohort effects explain part of  our earlier results about the lower 
productivity of  the older generation at a given point in time. However, the age variable is 
still significant for males even when the cohort variables are included. Finally, the results 
in column (4) where research inactive individuals have been dropped are qualitatively the 
same as when they are included in column (3). Consistent with earlier results the produc-
tivity of  males declines less rapidly when the inactive are excluded but they nevertheless 
decline with age. We thus find support for all three effects; the human capital effect (re-
search of  the active members of  staff  is declining in age), the selection effect (inactivity 
is increasing in age), and the cohort effect (older cohorts less productive).
4. Conclusions
Measured research output may decline as an academic approaches retirement for several 
reasons. First, the future rewards from successful research and the penalty from having 
not engaged in research decrease with fewer years remaining in the profession. Second, 
setbacks in publishing may affect the older academics more because the younger ones 
have more years ahead to expect successes. Third, any apparent relationship between age 
and research activity may only reflect a cohort effect, the older cohort not having had 
the same opportunities for research during their tenure.
Looking at data on research output from the University of  Iceland, we find support 
for all three effects: The risk of  becoming inactive is rising in age for men, the output of  
research active men tends to fall in age; and the older cohorts are less productive than 
the most recent ones. These results are consistent with those of  Oster and Hamermesh 
(1998) who also found that research activity was declining in age. As in Levin and Ste-
phan (1991) we find that publishing productivity reaches a peak in the early to mid-
forties. The increased job security of  professors does not reduce research; professors 
tend to be considerably more productive than either associate professors or assistant 
professors. There are also significant differences between average research outputs be-
tween departments. 
There are interesting differences between the genders. Men slow significantly down 
in their fifties and sixties after peaking in their early forties; the measured output drops 
by 50% from the early forties to their late sixties. Women also peak in their early forties 
but drop by 28% from their early forties to their late sixties. Men tend to produce more 
than women in their thirties and forties but lose their edge in their fifties and sixties. 
When only the research active are included, research activity is now less declining in age 
for men and especially for women. This suggests that it is to some extent the research 
inactive in later working life that pull down average research activity in these years. One 
possible reason for the gender differences is that motherhood affects the research of  
women adversely in their thirties and forties.14 However, the university data on research 
activity do not allow us to test for this effect. Further work is needed to explore the 




university. This would involve using survey data that matched personal attributes and 
family status with the research output.
The results provide support for the selection and the cohort effects. Panel estima-
tion, which includes individual-specific random effects and also terms that correct for 
cohort differences show that older cohorts are less productive while not changing the 
result that research output is falling in age. Thus, we find that the output of  research 
active men falls with age and their rate of  inactivity increases while older cohorts are 
less productive. 
Finally, a note on the limitations of  this study. Assigning one number to measure 
the research output of  an academic clearly provides only a very rough measure of  his 
research activity, as explained in footnote 8. Someone spending years writing a book or a 
paper that subsequently gets published in a top journal or by a good publisher would be 
assigned a lower measure of  output than someone publishing several papers in a lesser 
journal or by a lesser publishing house in the system used at the University of  Iceland. 
Thus any numerical measure of  research output is fundamentally subjective. Having said 
that, to the extent that members of  staff  respond to the incentives of  their own home 
institution, the measure of  performance can be used in this study. 
Notes
1 See http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/deadwood.
2 Even in the case of  athletes, the retirement decision is to some extent up to the individual’s discre-
tion because the rate of  deterioration of  physical ability has been shown to be quite small. See Fair 
(1994, 2007) who fails to find a strong effect of  aging on physical abilities. 
3 Only in particle physics was there no age effect present.
4 They include both single-author and multi-author publications. 
5 Similar results are reached by Lehman (1953and for other disciplines. 
6 McDowell (1982) calculates depreciation rates for different academic fields and finds that it varies 
so that it is lower in humanities. He argues that this may explain why women are overrepresented in 
humanities and underrepresented in the sciences due to expected disruptions in their careers due to 
motherhood. 
7 The data were provided by Baldvin Zarioh in the Division of  Science and Innovation at the Univer-
sity of  Iceland.
8 The research points mix magnitude and quality of  research. Thus a paper published in a refereed 
international journal gives more points than a possibly more labour-intensive paper published in a 
domestic journal. Also, publishing a greater number of  smaller, less labour-intensive papers may 
generate more points than publishing fewer more labour-intensive papers. The rule used to take into 
account the number of  co-authors is also rather ad-hoc and can be criticized, i.e. the lead author 
gets the same number of  points as the less decisive co-author. There were also some changes in the 
system during the period 2003-2008 so that the years are not entirely comparable.
9 The Tobit model is designed to estimate linear relationships between variables when there is either 
left- or right-censoring in the dependent variable. In this case there is censoring from below at zero 
points.
10 A Wald test for the equality of  all age coefficients yields F= 1.64 (probability =0.12) for all members 
of  staff; F= 2.21 (probability of  0.03) for men; and F=0.61 (probability of  0.75) for women. Hence, 
only in the case of  men is the equality rejected.
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of  staff; F= 1.99 (probability of  0.06) for men; and F=0.73 (probability of  0.64) for women. We 
can reject equality for men at the 10% level of  significance but we cannot reject equality in the case 
of  women nor the whole sample. 
12 Thus from column (2) we can see that a 55-59 year old member of  the economics department who 
is a professor would have 25.05-2.33+16.98 = 39.7 research points.
13 We should note that the age profile is similar for the three academic positions; the average age of  
professors in the sample was 56, the average age of  associate professors 52 and the average age of  
assistant professors was 49.
14 This was the finding of  Zie and Shauman (1998) and Shauman and Xie (1996).
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Appendix 
University of  Iceland point system for research (Since 2003)
A1. Dissertations 
A1.1 Candidate- or masters thesis (15 points) 
A1.2 Doctoral thesis (30 points)
A2. Books 
A2.1 Books, academic (10-60 points) 
A2.2 Books, republications (0-10 points)
A3. Academic articles in journals 
A3.1 Article in internationally acknowledged journals cited in ISI Web of  Science(15 
points) 
A3.2 Article in other refereed journals (10 points) 
A3.3 Other material in refereed journals (0-5 points) 
A3.4 Article in a non-refereed journal (0-5 points)
A4. Papers in refereed conference proceedings and book chapters 
A4.1 Paper in a refereed conference proceedings (5-10 points) 
A4.2 Book chapter (5-10 points)
A5. Other academic activity 
A5.1 Scientific report or memorandum (0-5 points) 
A5.2 Book review (1-2 points) 
A5.3 Lectures 
    5.3.1 Lecture at scientific conference (3 points) 
    5.3.2 Lecture for the academic community (1 point) 
    5.3.3 Plenary lecture or keynote address at an international conference (5 points) 
A5.4 Posters 
    5.4.1 Poster at a scientific conference (2 points) 
    5.4.2 Poster at other meetings (1 point) 
A5.5 Translations (0-10 points) 
A5.6 Other (software, patents, psychological tests, bills, design projects etc.) (0-10 
points) 
A6. Citations in ISI Web of  Science 
First 10 citations: 1 point/citation 
Next 20 citations: 0,5 point/citation 
Citations exceeding 30: 0,1 point/citation.
7. Editorial work, academic publications 
7.1. Editor of  an academic journal (2-5 points/year) 
7.2. Member of  editorial board of  an academic journal (1-2 points/year) 
7.3. Editor of  an academic book (2-5 points) 
7.4 Member of  editorial board of  an academic book (1-2 points)
In the case of  multiple author articles or books, the points are calculated using the  
following formula:2 authors: 1,5 x points / 2, 3 authors: 1,8 x points / 3, 4 authors or 
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Table A1. Summary of data – Departments 
Schools Departments Staff 
members











Social and human sciences 22 10 12 51.7 38.6 17.0
Social work 7 1 6 51.0 24.2 15.4
Economics 15 14 1 45.8 33.6 31.6
Law 25 17 8 46.1 27.7 26.0
Political science 7 7 0 50.1 40.6 25.1
Business Administration 18 15 3 50.7 13.1 13.2
Health sciences Nursing 29 3 26 50.7 18.6 21.8
Pharmaceutical sciences 9 4 5 46.4 19.6 21.7
Medicine 110 77 23 54.8 17.1 22.9
Food science and nutrition 9 6 3 51.6 36.7 36.9
Psychology 11 9 2 50.7 33.4 30.3
Odontology 17 15 2 54.6 16.6 34.3
Humanities
Languages, literature and linguistics 19 8 11 50.7 16.7 16.4
Theology and religious studies 10 8 2 54.4 18.4 16.8
Icelandic and comparative cultural 
studies
29 15 14 52.7 31.9 30.7
History and philosophy 26 20 6 53.5 39.3 25.7
Education
Sport, leisure studies and social 
education
11 5 6 47.1 21.0 17.3
Teacher education 70 28 42 56.3 20.4 20.4
Educational studies 25 18 7 54.9 30.2 26.8
Engineering and 
Natural Sciences
Industrial-, mechanical engineering 
and computer science
21 19 2 49.0 21.1 18.8
Earth sciences 8 7 1 60.3 36.4 17.3
Life and environmental sciences 31 17 14 51.3 27.1 18.3
Electrical and computer engineering 10 9 1 49.2 33.6 34.1
Physical sciences 42 41 1 53.5 20.6 26.2
Civil and environmental engineering 15 14 1 51.6 37.4 28.1
The table shows the number of  members of  staff, their average age, average number of  research points and the within-group 
standard deviation.
Table A2. Summary of data – Institutes 








The Árni Magnússon Institute for Icelandic Studies 14 10 4 57.6 29.4 21.3
Institute for Experimental Pathology, University of Iceland 10 3 7 57.7 18.7 13.1
Science Institute 26 19 7 49.2 34.4 36.8
Other institutes 4 4 0 43.5 11.7 4.4
The table shows the number of  members of  staff, their average age, average number of  




Figure A1. The distribution of output for different age groups
The left-hand panel shows the distribution of  research output when everyone is in-
cluded while the right-hand side panel show the distribution when the research inactive 
have been removed from the sample.

